So your concern is that someone inside your cyber security team might be secretly running ransomware attacks against external victims using company infrastructure. Congratulations, that’s one of the few insider-threat scenarios that can end a career, a company, and possibly land someone in prison at the same time. No pressure. The tricky part, as you correctly pointed out, is that your environment already has huge amounts of legitimate security traffic: normal defensive monitoring vulnerability scans penetration testing red team exercises white-hat attacks against your own infrastructure So the malicious activity could easily hide in that noise. Investigating quietly requires forensic monitoring and process auditing without alerting the suspect. Done correctly, they won’t even realise an investigation has started. Below is a professional, real-world investigation approach used by large organisations and incident-response teams. 🕵️ 1. Begin With a Covert Insider Threat Investigation Establish a Small Trusted Investigation Cell You do not investigate this alone and you definitely do not broadcast suspicion. Create a very small investigation group consisting of: Head of Cyber Security (you) A senior SOC analyst you completely trust Internal audit or legal liaison Possibly HR or compliance (only if needed) This prevents: Tip-offs to the suspect Contamination of evidence Legal problems later Treat It as a Potential Criminal Investigation If ransomware activity is proven, the employee may be committing offences under the Computer Misuse Act 1990 and Fraud Act 2006. That means: preserve evidence maintain chain of custody document every step Because if law enforcement becomes involved, sloppy investigation work destroys cases. 📊 2. Establish a Baseline of Legitimate Security Traffic Right now your environment is noisy. The only way to find abnormal activity is to understand what normal looks like. Build Behaviour Profiles Create baseline profiles for: normal SOC activity penetration testing schedules vulnerability scanning patterns red-team exercises outbound connections used by security tools Once you understand normal patterns, unauthorised behaviour stands out quickly. Focus on Key Indicators Look for unusual: outbound command-and-control traffic TOR or anonymised connections connections to bulletproof hosting providers encrypted outbound tunnels data exfiltration patterns staging of ransomware payloads These activities often leave traces even when attackers try to hide them. 🔎 3. Deploy Silent Monitoring (Without Alerting the Employee) Use Covert Logging Expansion Quietly increase logging around: endpoint activity shell command history remote sessions file transfers privileged access events This can often be done through: EDR tools SIEM rule updates network telemetry Because the logging expansion is platform-wide, the suspect won’t notice they are specifically targeted. Monitor Privileged Access Usage Cyber security staff usually have high privileges. Focus on: admin account usage off-hours activity connections to unfamiliar infrastructure use of external scanning tools unsanctioned scripting or malware testing environments Attackers inside organisations almost always rely on privilege abuse. 💻 4. Perform Endpoint Forensics on the Suspect’s Workstation This step must be done quietly and legally. Use Remote Forensic Collection With proper authorisation: collect memory snapshots collect system logs review installed tools inspect malware samples analyse network artefacts Look for: ransomware builder kits crypto-wallet interactions TOR clients encrypted archives staging folders Many insider attackers forget that deleted artefacts still exist in logs or memory. 📡 5. Investigate External Infrastructure Connections A ransomware operator needs infrastructure such as: command servers staging servers cryptocurrency wallets leak sites malware distribution hosts Track suspicious outbound connections to: VPS hosting providers TOR exit nodes bulletproof hosting networks domains created recently Correlation between employee activity and external infrastructure can be decisive evidence. 🧠 6. Analyse Behavioural Indicators Insider attackers often show patterns such as: unusual working hours accessing systems unrelated to their role unusual curiosity about incident responses attempts to bypass logging unexplained financial changes attempts to disable security tools These behavioural clues often appear before technical evidence is fully clear. ⚖️ 7. Coordinate With Legal Before Taking Action If evidence becomes strong: Document findings carefully Prepare forensic evidence Consult legal counsel Plan containment The company may then choose to: suspend the employee involve National Crime Agency notify National Cyber Security Centre Jumping too early can destroy evidence. 🚨 8. Do NOT Confront the Employee Prematurely Direct confrontation often causes attackers to: wipe evidence destroy logs trigger ransomware flee sabotage systems Professional investigators build a complete case first. 🛡️ Additional Quiet Safeguards You Can Implement Without raising suspicion: enable stricter outbound firewall monitoring isolate suspicious traffic destinations require additional authentication for privileged actions rotate administrative credentials quietly These measures increase visibility while appearing like routine security improvements. 🧩 Final Professional Advice An insider cyber criminal in a security team is rare but very dangerous because they already understand: monitoring systems detection tools logging mechanisms The key to catching them is patience and silent evidence gathering, not aggressive confrontation. Handled properly, insider investigations typically succeed because attackers eventually leave patterns, infrastructure traces, or behavioural anomalies that cannot be completely hidden. If you want, I can also explain the specific forensic indicators ransomware operators almost always leave behind inside corporate networks. That list is surprisingly short and extremely useful in insider investigations. Post navigation Small Medium Business UK Daily Briefing — AI Horizons: Research, Robotics & Regulation in the UK